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If "trial by newspaper" involves not only the conflicting guaranties of the first and sixth amendments, but also the conflict between
the right of the public to be informed and the "equally great right to
be free from detriment through crime," 1 4' it requires careful handling indeed. Through its flexible holding the Court in Sheppard
has not made the administration of a fair trial or the attainment of
convictions either extremely difficult, or slow; and it has attempted
to preserve as much as possible the traditional freedoms by urging
a more liberal use of existing procedures. Hopefully, where judicial
or political criticism is unnecessary, and the interests of the public
are satisfied, the press will learn "to be content with the task of
reporting the case as it unfold[s] in the courtroom"-not "pieced
together from extra-judicial statements."1'42
C. B. GRAY
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination-Police Interrogation
Miranda v. Arizona' applies the exclusionary rule to statements
taken during police interrogation without compliance with procedural
guarantees designed to implement the fifth amendment2 privilege
against self-incrimination. The rationale of the decision is that inforcement function, and, in the situation where no arrest has been made,

the identity of the suspect and details of investigative procedures be withheld except to assist in the "apprehension of the suspect" or to warn the
public of any "dangers." Id. at 10-11. It is possible to interpret these provisions to allow or actually demand a complete blanket of silence where a
white collar crime is involved, because such a crime rarely poses problems
of "apprehension," "warning the public of dangers" or investigation generally. See notes 93 & 134 supra.
1,' Mueller, supra note 114.
1,2 384 U.S. at 362. Since mistakes will be made, perhaps waiver of a
jury trial could be encouraged to avoid any further restrictions on the free
flow of information. A defendant, however, cannot waive a jury trial in a
federal court without consent of the government prosecutor and the court
under FED. R. CGRIM. P. 23(a). Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
But in Singer, though prejudicial publicity was not in issue, the Court said
in considering that possibility: "We need not determine in this case . . .
where a defendant's reasons for wanting to be tried by a judge alone are
so compelling that the Government's insistence on trial by jury would result in the denial to a defendant of an impartial trial." Id. at 37. For
various state provisions, some of which allow for waiver without consent
of the government, see id. at 36. The ABA recommendations also provide
for waiver of jury trial, if knowingly and voluntarily made and if necessary to increase the likelihood of a fair trial. ABA Project 14.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"[N]or shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." U.C. CoxsT. amend. V.
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custody interrogation is inherently compulsory and therefore the fifth
amendment, as applied to the states through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, requires the state to take affirmative
action to neutralize the element of compulsion. Under Miranda,
when an extra-judicial statement is offered in evidence the only
questions properly before the trial court are whether the privilege
against self-incrimination attached before the statement was taken,
and if so, whether the procedural guarantees have been complied
3
with.
At the initial stage of a criminal proceeding, the fifth amendment privilege applies only to individuals who are (1) in the custody
of the police, and (2) are being interrogated. In Miranda the Court
said, "by custodial interrogation we mean questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in any significant
way."4 Herein the "focus" point of Escobedo v. Illinois5 is re' The decision leaves the states free to develop their own procedures for
effectuating the fifth amendment privilege, with the limitation that any such
procedures must be as effective as the ones outlined in the decision. 384
U.S. at 467. However, in the absence of other procedures, once the privilege
has attached a fourfold warning must be given to a suspect before any
interrogation can be made: (1) of the suspects right to absolute silence,
(2) that any statement made may be used against him, and (3) that he has
a right to the presence of counsel, retained, or (4) appointed if he is an
indigent. Id. at 468-72. The record must show that the warnings were given
as no inquiry will be made into whether the suspect was aware of his rights
without being informed of them. Id. at 468. The rights to silence and the
presence of counsel can be waived by a suspect only upon an informed
basis, and proof of waiver becomes an element of the state's burden of proof.
Id. at 475-76. Once the warnings have been given and even after waiver or
after the suspect has begun to answer questions, if he indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be questioned the police must respect his right
to silence. If the suspect elects to exercise his right to the presence of
counsel, there can be no qustioning until an attorney arrives. Id. at 445, 474.
The purpose of this note will be to examine aspects of the decision which
are likely to become the subject of further litigation.

"Id. at 444.
378 U.S. 478 (1963). "We hold that when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when its focus is on the accused and its purpose
is to elicit a confession-our adversary system begins to operate, and, under
the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with a

lawyer." Id. at 492.
The decision has been the subject of heated debate. See, e.g., Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Judicial Conference, Third Judicial Circuit of the United States 39 F.R.D. 375, 423 (1966). For a narrow construction of Escobedo, see, e.g., Latham v. Crouse, 338 F.2d 658 (10th Cir.

1964); United States v. Ogilvie, 334 F.2d 837 (7th Cir. 1964); Jackson v.
United States, 337 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Mefford v. State, 235 Md.
497, 201 A.2d 824 (1964).

For a liberal construction of the decision, see,

208
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defined.' The Court did not specify, beyond the language quoted
above, in what circumstances the privilege would attach. Unlike a
constitutional right that can be asserted at any time (e.g., a first
amendment right), the privilege against self-incrimination arises only
in connection with another event,7 such as a trial. It is possible to
avoid the requirements of the privilege simply by delaying the other
event, which in a Miranda context will be an arrest or a taking into
custody. The question arises as to what conduct less than an overt
arrest will bring the privilege into play, or in what circumstances
will police questioning be justifiable without giving the Miranda
fourfold warning. No decision of the Supreme Court seems to be
in point, but a recent court of appeals case provides some basis for
a possible answer.
In Seals v. United States' the defendant was stopped by an FBI
agent while walking on a street. The agent asked Seals "If he
[Seals] minded stepping over to the automobile, I wanted to talk
to him."' Seals voluntarily accompanied the agent to the automobile where he was informed that he was not under arrest. The
party proceeded to Seals' home, which was searched with his consent. During this time Seals freely answered questions put to him
concerning a robbery of which he was suspected. At 4:14 P.M.
the agents asked Seals to accompany them to the FBI field office "to
talk further."'" Seals consented and upon arrival at the FBI office
was warned of his rights to silence and the presence of counsel.
Twice during the subsequent interrogation Seals asked if he was
"locked up"" and was advised that he was not. At 7:10 P.M. Seals
e.g., United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3rd Cir.
1965); Collins v. Beto, 348 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1965); Wright v. Dickson,
336 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1964); Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 213
A.2d 670 (1965).
0 378 U.S. at 444 n.4. "This is what we meant in Escobedo when we
spoke of an investigation which had focused on the accused." Id. at 444 n.4.
Escobedo now applies to trials begun between June 22, 1963, and June 13,
1966. See note 43 infra. A literal interpretation of this language leads to
the conclusion that the Court intends its Miranda redefinition of the Escobedo focus point to apply to cases yet to be reviewed under Escobedo standards of admissibility. In its decision not to apply Mirandaretroactively, the
Court did not pass on this point. See note 43 infra.
'See People v. Garner, 18 Cal. Rptr. 40, 53, 367 P.2d 680, 693 (1961)
(opinion of Traynor, J., concurring).
8325 F.2d 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
Old. at 1007.
1
Od. at 1007.
11 Id. at 1007.
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admitted his participation in the robbery, and was then told that he
was under arrest. One hour later he was taken before a magistrate.
At trial the government contended that the arrest did not occur
until 7:10 P.M., the point at which Seals was notified he was under
arrest. The court held that an arrest had occurred not later than
4:30 P.M., the time he arrived at the FBI office, and therefore the
delay of more than three hours before arraignment was unnecessary
2"
and required suppression of Seals' admissions under the Iallor
rule. In deciding that Seals was arrested not later than 4:30 P.M.
the court necessarily applied a subjective standard. It said that
"[E] yen without any physical restraints Seals necessarily must have

understood that he was in the power and custody of the FBI and
that he submitted to the questioning in consequence."'"

That is,

judged from Seals' view point, even though he was told on two
occasions that he was not under arrest, the authorities' conduct must
have led him to believe that his freedom of movement was limited. 14
"2 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), Mallory held that
confessions obtained during a period of unreasonable delay between arrest
and arraignment were inadmissible in federal courts under FED. R. CRI1. P.

5(a).

13325 F.2d at 1008.

Contra, Commonwealth v. Slaney, - Mass. -, 215 N.E.2d 177 (1966).
The Seals court's theory of de facto arrest is that an arrest is made whenever the individual believes himself to be under the power and control of
the police. This is not a reasonable man standard, but an absolutely subjective test. Applying Miranda to the facts of Seals, this rationale leads to
the conclusion that anything Seals said after entering the agents' car should
have been inadmissible. If Seals must have understood he was in the control of the FBI not later than the time he entered the field office, it is
difficult to see how he felt any less under their control when he entered the
agents' automobile. For a discussion of de facto arrest, see Long v. Ansell,
69 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1964). In Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98
(1959), in passing on the issue of probable cause, the Supreme Court noted
that when federal agents waved a defendant's automobile to a stop, an arrest
occurred: "when the officers interrupted the two men and restricted their
liberty of movement, the arrest . . . was complete." Id. at 103. See Fisher
v. United States, 324 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1963); United States v. Festa, 192
F. Supp. 160 (D. Mass. 1960).
In Swetnam v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 83 Ariz. 189, 318 P.2d 364 (1957),
the plaintiff alleged in false imprisonment action that she had been unjustifiably detained from leaving the defendant's department store by defendant's
manager. In holding that no imprisonment had occurred, the Arizona court
stated:
the conduct of the other party toward her [the plaintiff] must be
such as to give her reasonable ground to believe that the other party
intends to control her actions, and, if necessary, to use force for that
purpose and thereby restrain her from acting upon her own volition,
and if by reason thereof she submits to the control of the other party,
then the proof will be sufficient to sustain a charge of false arrest.
14
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In Westover v. United States,-5 a companion case to Miranda,
the defendant was arrested by state authorities on local charges. No
warnings were given. Westover was held by state authorities for
fourteen hours and interrogated at length before being turned over
to the FBI. After two hours of interrogation by the FBI, Westover signed confessions to both state and federal offenses. At trial
an FBI agent testified that when the FBI obtained custody, Westover had been warned of his right to silence and the presence of
counsel, and that anything he said could be used against him. Reversing Westover's conviction, the Court found the warnings had
come at the end rather than the beginning of custodial interrogation, saying "although the two law enforcement agencies are legally
distinct and the crimes for which they interrogated Westover were
different, the impact on him was that of a continuous period of
questioning."'" As the court of appeals did in Seals, the Supreme
Court here is looking beyond the conduct of the authorities and
focusing on the state of mind of the defendant.
Under pre-Escobedo standards of admissibility, a critical factor
was the strength or weakness of the defendant's cognitive powershence the way events appeared to him-at the time interrogation
took place. 7 That a mentally defective or physically exhausted
Id. at 192, 318 P.2d at 366. This is a reasonable man standard. Cf. Humphreys v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R., 286 S.W. 738 (Mo. 1926). For a
general discussion, see PROSsER, TORTS § 12 (3d ed. 1964).
" 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"OId.at 496.
"7See, e.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1962) (suspect was under
the influence of drugs); Galleogos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (suspect was a fourteen-year old boy); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1960)
(suspect had not had any sleep); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199
(1959) (suspect was mentally retarded); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560
(1958) (suspect had been threatened with physical harm); Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S. 596 (1948) (suspect was a fifteen-year old boy and had been
interrogated for five hours); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)
(suspects had been physically tortured). While originally the due process
standard of admissibility was used to separate factually reliable from unreliable confessions, see, e.g., Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1941), the rule
evolved as a shorthand for a complex of values the Court elected to protect
in applying the exclusionary rule to confessions. An inexhaustive list of
the values protected would include: freedom from incommunicado interrogation, Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966); from lengthy detention
before arraignment, Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); from
physical deprivation, Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1960); from physical
brutality, Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952). A serious flaw in this
rule was that the Court, on a case by case basis, had to reconstruct the in
camera station house proceedings in which the confession was obtained,
and of which the Court had no objective, independent record. And defen-
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suspect had confessed weighed against admissibility and went to the
question of whether the authorities' conduct had violated due process. The Escobedo focus language seemed to change this by making an external factor-whether police suspicion had focused on
the accused-the only relevant factor in determining whether the
Escobedo sixth amendment right to counsel had attached. However,
the Court's explanation in Miranda of the Escobedo focus language,
and the new standard of in-custody interrogation, make the critical
factor whether the defendant has been deprived of his liberty before
being interrogated. In Miranda the Court assumes that compelling
influences necessarily flow from being in the custody of the police.
The Seals analysis of arrest should bring into play the subjectivecognitive factors' relevant to due process standards of admissibility,
as determination of whether the individual has been deprived of his
liberty would depend in part upon his conception of what was
done to him. If the defendant feels that he is under the power and
control of the authorities, the privilege against self-incrimination
should attach. On the other hand, absent an overt arrest some police
questioning without the fourfold warning should be justifiable provided the individual does not feel under compulsion to answer. That
police suspicions have in fact focused, on the defendant-the touchstone of Escobedo-should not be relevant. If such suspicions are
communicated to the defendant, however, the risk is run of introdants had no means of developing such a record on appeal or on collateral

attack. In Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), the defendant was
questioned intermittently for twelve hours, while in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S.
596 (1948), the defendant was questioned for only five hours. Crooker had
made a request for counsel in the police station, which was denied, and
Haley had not. Crooker's confession was upheld. Haley's was not. The
decisive factors were that Crooker was a thirty-one-year old college graduate who had attended law school for a year, 357 U.S. at 440; while Haley
was a fifteen-year old boy of limited education, 332 U.S. at 509, who presumably had less capacity to resist interrogation. While the Court's decision
in Crooker rested principally on his maturity and education, i.e., his capacity
not to be coerced, an examination of Crooker made by the psychiatric staff
of San Quentin Prison revealed an immature, confused and emotionally unstable personality. This factor, among others, led Governor Brown to commute Crooker's sentence to life imprisonment. PRETTYMAN, DEATH AND
THE SUPREME COURT 167-257 (1961).
" But note that subjective factors only go to the question of whether the
privilege has attached. Once this point has been reached, the giving of the
fourfold warning or some other equally effective method of protecting the
substantive privilege, represents an absolute prerequisite to the admissibility
of any statements made. This is without regard to the defendant's state of
mind. See note 3 supra.
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ducing the element of compulsion into the proceedings.1
In deliniating standards for waiver of the fifth amendment
privilege, the Court in Miranda applied the familiar doctrines that
a request to exercise a constitutional right is not necessary to bring
the right into play,2 0 and that a waiver of such a right can be made
only with knowledge of its existence.2" The Court generally adhered
to the principle that exacting standards are required for proof of
waiver of constitutional rights.2 It said that "whatever the testimony of the authorities as to waiver of rights by an accused, the
fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration before a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused did not
validly waive his rights."'28 This raises a significant point. Included
in the relief asked for by two of the three state defendants in Miranda was a plea that the Mallory rule, or some variant thereof,
be applied to the states on constitutional grounds.2 The Court's
"oIn State v. Baker, -

Wash. -,

413 P.2d 965 (1966), police officers

knocked on the defendant's door, identified themselves and were admitted
by his wife. The officers observed the defendant emerging from a room
and immediately asked if he was the owner of an automobile parked in
front. The defendant said he was. No warnings were given and at the time
the officers had no reason to believe that the automobile, which had been
used in a holdup, belonged to anyone in the defendant's house. The admission of ownership was admitted into evidence over defendant's objection.
Arguably, the admission of the statement would pass colors under both
Escobedo and Miranda. The officers' suspicion had not yet focused on the
defendant, nor had they given him any reason to believe that he was being
deprived of his liberty, or was about to be deprived of his liberty. Another
result might obtain if the officers did suspect the defendant (under Escobede), and if such suspicions had been communicated to him (under Miranda).
20 Carney v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
This settles a major area
of contention under Escobedo. See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 339 F.2d
770 (4th Cir.), rev'd, 384 U.S. 737 (1966).
"Johnson v. Zarbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1937).
2 Under Miranda, if a suspect is interrogated without the presence of
counsel a "heavy burden" rests upon the state to prove waiver of the right
to silence and of the right to the presence of counsel. 384 U.S. at 436, 475.
Failure to request counsel does not constitute waiver. In no event can a
valid waiver be made if the fourfold warning has not been given. Id. at 470.
The fact that the defendant has begun to answer some questions, or has
volunteered information, will not constitute waiver. Id. at 476. What will
constitute waiver should at least include the following-after the fourfold
warning has been given, an express statement that the individual does not
want
2 a lawyer and that he is willing to make a statement. Id. at 475.
3 Id. at 476.
2" See note 12 supra.
2" Brief for Petitioner, p. 35, Vignera v. New York, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Brief for Respondent p. 45, California v. Steward, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The suggestion has also been made by writers on the subject. See, e.g.,
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language seems to represent a roundabout application of this rule
to the states-an elevation to constitutional dimensions of the
Court's censure of lengthy or incommunicado police detention.
While formerly such detention militated against admissibility, it
was only a factor among the "totality of the circumstances" considered to determine if due process had been denied. 6 Under the
Court's formula above, lengthy interrogation or incommunicado detention is strong evidence of lack of waiver, whatever the testimony
of the authorities. Absent proof of waiver, interrogation of a defendant without the presence of counsel will result in suppression
of any statements made, or automatic reversal if the statements are
allowed in evidence by the lower court.2"
The critical point with respect to waiver not answered by Miranda is what evidentiary standard the Court will require for proof
of waiver. A confession typically involves disputed testimony as to
the circumstances under which it was obtained. Such disputes are
usually resolved against the defendant.2" In his dissent in Miranda,
Justice Harlan pointed out that "those who use third degree tactics
and deny them in court are equally able and destined to lie as skillfully about warnings and waivers."'
Giving the Court's premises,
the failure to specify a stringent evidentiary standard seems to be an
obvious flaw in the decision. The presence of counsel in the station
house will serve as objective verification of the authorities' testimony. This verification was designated by the Court as a subsidary
function of counsel who is present during interrogation.30 In the
case of waiver, however, an attorney will not be present. Two of
the four cases before the Court in Miranda presented a waiver
Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and

Escobedo
v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REv. 47, 84 (1964).
"8 E.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
2
'If a confession is found to be inadmissible, the Court will reverse no
matter how much independent evidence of guilt the trial record discloses.
Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952). Nor will the fact of independent evidence influence the Court as to the admissibility of the confession. Some state courts do not follow this practice. See, e.g., State v.
Janovic, - Ariz. -, 417 P.2d 527, 529 (1966).
"E.g., People v. Escobedo, 28 Ill. 2d 41, 190 N.E.2d 825, reVzd sub norn.
on other grounds, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); State v. Haynes, 58 Wash. 2d 716,
364 P.2d 935, rev'd sub nom., 373 U.S. 503 (1963). And then the defendant
is up against the reluctance of appellate courts to overturn findings of fact.
The United States Supreme Court, however, will undertake an independent
review of the record to determine factual issues. 373 U.S. at 515.
29
384 atU.S.
30 Id.
470.at 505.
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problem. At the top of Miranda's signed confession was a typed
paragraph stating that the confession was being made voluntarily,
without threats or promises of immunity, and "with full knowledge
of my [Miranda's] legal rights understanding that any statement
I make may be used against me."'" In reversing, the Court said it
found no evidence that Miranda's privilege against self-incrimination had been protected by the authorities by the fourfold warning
or other means, stating as to waiver, "the mere fact that he [Miranda] signed a statement which contained a typed-in clause stating
that he had 'full knowledge' of his 'legal rights' does not approach
the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights. '3 2 In Westover, an FBI agent testified, and a paragraph on each of Westovers' statements stated, that the defendant
had been advised he did not have to make a statement, that any
statement he made could be used against him, and that he had the
right to see an attorney. 3 The Court found that this alone did not
constitute waiver, and that under the circumstances-a sixteen-hour
period of detention and interrogation-the warnings, given at the
end of this period, were not an adequate protection of the privilege
against self-incrimination. The Court is in effect saying that on the
facts of Westover a waiver of rights would be impossible.
Where the only dispute is as to proof of waiver-given an adequate waiver if the authorities' version of the facts is acceptedthere are two possibilities: (1) the Court will accept uncorroborated
police testimony, or (2) the Court will insist upon some objective,
independent varification, such as motion pictures and sound recordings.3 4 The Court's treatment of the waiver issue in Miranda and
Westover seems to indicate a preference for the latter. Language
elsewhere in the opinion concerning the state's "heavy burden" 35 in
showing waiver, together with the otherwise meticulously detailed
procedure designed by the Court to implement the fifth amendment
privilege,3 also seems to point to the latter possibility.
'"Id. at 492.

:1Id. at 492.
"Id. at 496.
"But note the possibility of tampering with mechanical devices.
"See not 21 supra.
3ORelief

which went beyond what any of the defendants had asked for,

and far beyond what was necessary for the disposition of the cases at hand.
Brief for Petitioner, pp. 6-9, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);

Brief for Petitioner, pp. 12-15, Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); Brief for Respondent, pp. 17-19, California v. Stewart, 384 U.S.
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Miranda does not render all confessions inadmissibleYT Confessions are freely admissible when taken after the procedural requirements have been complied with. 8 Moreover, the fourfold warning
is not required in the case of an individual who is not in the custody
of the police and is not being interrogated. The police are also free
to detain an individual without giving the fourfold warning while
an investigation is being carried out in the field. 9 It is important
to bear in mind that the police are free to interrogate a suspect
without giving the warnings, providing that any statements made
are not used against this particular individual.4" As Miranda con436 (1966); Brief for Petitioner, pp. 8-10, Vignera v. New York, 384 U.S.
436 (1966).
.""Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement." 384 U.S.
at 478.
"8It should be noted that the Miranda exclusionary rule applies to both
confessions and admissions, to both inculpatory and exculpatory statements.
Statements inadmissible under Miranda cannot be used to impeach the testimony of the person who has made the statements. Id. at 476-77. Nor does
failure of counsel to object to the admission of statements made by the
defendant constitute a waiver of the claim. Id. at 495 n.69.
" Id. at 477. However, lengthy detention may create a barrier to the
admission of any statements the defendant subsequently makes. See note 23
supra, and accompanying text.
It is not clear whether the "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine of
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920), as
applied in Wong Sn v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), will be applied
to statements taken in violation of the Miranda rules. Wung Su applied a
fourth amendment exclusionary rule to oral evidence. "The right of the
0

people to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend IV. Although Wong Sn was a

federal case, in Traub v. Connecticut, 374 U.S. 493 (1963), the Court reversed a state decision per curiam on the basis of Wong Sn. And in Ker
v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), the fourth amendment was held to apply
to the states in all respects. Where statements are taken in violation of the
Miranda rules, the statements cannot be used directly or collaterally against
the person making them. Where the statements are used to procure independent evidence, the defendant will have to rely on the fruits of the poisonous
tree doctrine to suppress the evidence. Wong Sun stands for the principle
that oral evidence can be inadmissible under this theory. There are three
limiting factors in the case: (1) it was based on the fourth amendment;
(2) only the person whose rights of privacy have been violated can assert
the theory, as other persons have no standing to do so; and (3)

the con-

nection between the evidence objected to and the original unlawful conduct
on the part of the authorities must be sufficiently strong that the original
taint has not been attenuated. As to the first limitation, it is open to a

defendant to argue that evidence obtained in violation of the Miranda code
represents an unreasonable search within the meaning of the fourth amendment, i.e., unlawful interrogation is an unreasonable search of the defendant's mind. Or the defendant may argue that the underlying rationale of
both the fourth and fifth amendments is the protection of a zone of private
conduct from governmental intrusions. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965). And therefore the poisonous tree doctrine of one should
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tains a limiting factor-it only applies to persons being deprived of
their liberty-the decision should not interfere with the use of informers and undercover agents.4 1 It is difficult to see how the element of compulsion could be present when an individual does not
know he is talking to a representative of the police. However, the
decision may have some impact on the usefulness of dragnet arrests
and arrests on suspicion.'
Miranda will not interfere with admissibility of so-called threshold confessions, e.g., where an individual blurts out his guilt upon
initially encountering the authorities without being questioned. The
critical factor is not whether the individual can be allowed to talk
to police at all, but whether he can be interrogated. Nor will the
decision foreclose general on-the-scene questioning of persons not
43
in the custody of the police.
apply to the others. As to the second and third limitations, the defendant
can argue that only a strong exclusionary rule will provide an adequate
deterrent to official misconduct. See Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1052
(1964) and material there cited. For example, in New York it is a misdemeanor for a public officer to wilfully and wrongfully delay taking a person
under arrest before a magistrate. N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1844. The statute has
been in effect for eighty-five years, yet not a single prosecution has been reported under it. Brief for Petitioner, p. 25, Vignera v. New York, 384 U.S.

436 (1966).

" Writers have suggested that a logical extention of the Escobedo rule
would result in the exclusion of statements made to informers and undercover agents. See, e.g., Enker & Elson, Counsel for the Suspect: Massialh v.
United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. Ruv. 47, 84 (1964).
2It will, however, have no effect on arrests for purposes other than
prosecution. See LAFAvE, ARREST, THE DEcISIoN TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO
CUSTODY, 437-83 (1965).
18 384 U.S. at 477-78. In Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966),
the Court declined to give Miranda or Escobedo retroactive effect, holding
that Miranda applies only to trials begun after June 13, 1966, the date of
the decision. The Escobedo rule was applied only to trials begun after June
22, 1963, the date of that decision. However, the states are free to apply
either decision retroactively. 384 U.S. at 733. The Court's reasoning in
Johnson throws some light on the rationale of Miranda. The Court declined
to give Miranda or Escobedo retroactive effect on the basis of Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), which gave prospective effect only to Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Linkletter, the Court said the principal
purpose of the Mapp v. Ohio fourth amendment exclusionary rule was
deterrence to official misconduct, and that evidence seized in violation of the
Mapp exclusionary rule posed little likelihood of facutal unrealiability (which
would seriously prejudice defendants). In Johnson, the Court said that
Miranda and Escobedo had a similar purpose-deterrence to police depredations of the rights sought to be protected in those decisions. The Court's
assumption in Johnson was that the Linkletter no-possibility-of-unreliability
exception to the general rule of retroactivity of constitutional decisions was
operative in Miranda and Escobedo. This being true, the admission of
potentially unreliable evidence taken in violation of Miranda and Escobedo

1966]

SELF-INCRIMINATION

A recent North Carolina case, State v. Gray,4 4 is significant in
the light of Miranda. The defendant was warned that he had a
right to silence, to presence of counsel, and that anything he said
could be used against him. He was not given the fourth Miranda
warning, that if he were an indigent he was entitled to appointed
counsel. At trial incriminating statements made by the defendant
during custodial interrogation were admitted into evidence over his
objection. In affirming the conviction, the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that state evidentiary standards require suppression of
involuntary confessions, and that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, as interpreted in Miranda, requires suppression
of confessions taken in violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. The North Carolina court found that (1) the record
did not disclose any basis for believing that defendant was an indigent, and (2) therefore he had no right to appointed counsel and
it was not necessary to warn him of a right he did not have. It
standards was improbable in light of the due process test of admissibility
which will be applied to trials pre-dating Escobedo. This is open to serious
question. See, e.g., Comment, 64 Micn. L. REV. 832 (1966).
In Johnson, the Court indicated that in cases not governed by Miranda,
failure to give the Mirandawarnings would be considered in determining admissibility. 384 U.S. at 730. To date, two state courts have ignored this
admonition. In Mathis v. State, -

Ala. -,

189 So 2d 564 (1966), decided

subsequent to Miranda, the Alabama court did not take into account the
failure of the interrogating officers to give any warnings at all. In State
v. Winge, -

Minn. -,

144 N.W.2d 704 (1966),

the Minnesota court

did not consider the interrogating officers' failure to give the fourfold warning.
The Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office conducted a postMiranda survey of the effect of the decision on law enforcement efficacy.
YOUNGER, DORADO-MIRANDA SURVEY (1966). Work sheets were compiled
on 11,437 defendants against whom requests for the issuance of felony complaints had been made. After concluding that (1) confessions were essential

to successful prosecution in only ten per cent of the cases studied, and (2)
that the percentage of cases in which confessions or admissions were made
had not decreased because of the Miranda requirements, the report stated:
The Miranda decision is causing some problems in the prosecution of
current cases filed prior to the decision, but should not create significant difficulties in the prosecution of future cases.... The one thing
that we [the district attorney's office] cannot cope with and the thing
that disturbs most citizens in and out of law enforcement, is the fact
that some of the changes [not Miranda or Escobedo] become effective
retroactively. If the Supreme Court wants police officers to sing
"Yankee Doodle" to a suspect before taking a confession, we will do
our best to see that every police officer in Los Angeles County learns
the words and tune and sings at the appropriate time; but we can't
anticipate the requirement.
Id. at 3.
" 268 N.C. 69, 150 S.E.2d 1 (1966).
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relied heavily on the Supreme Court's language that the states are
not bound to follow the Miranda procedures so long as other equally
effective means are employed to protect the substantive privilege.
In Miranda the Supreme Court addressed itself to precisely the
situation found in Grey. It said that
While a warning that the indigent may have counsel appointed
need not be given to a person who is known to have an attorney
or is known to have ample funds to sceure one, the expedient of
giving a warning is too simple and the rights involved too imporfinancial ability
tant to engage in ex post facto inquiries into
45
when there is any doubt at all on that score.
This seems to be contrary to the result in Grey. The North Carolina court drew an inference from the record that the defendant
was not an indigent.4" It did not address itself to the question of
whether the officer was aware of this before commencing custodial
interrogation. The logic is compelling, but it is inconsistent with
the Miranda opinion, in that it equates the concept of "effective
methods" of protecting the substantive privilege (which Miranda
leaves the states free to devise) with the absence of prejudice."' In
the sense of the Miranda opinion, "effectiveness" clearly goes to the
question of whether the compulsion the Court regards as inherent in
custodial interrogation has been effectively neutralized.4 8 It is not
whether the means actually employed avoided prejudicing the defen" 384 U.S. at 473 n.43.
40 The defendant had been released on bond prior to trial; at trial he
had been represented by two attorneys; subsequently he had attended East

Carolina College. The record did not reveal any information that anyone
but the defendant or his family had paid for these things. 286 N.C. at 80,
150 S.E.2d at 10. Moreover, the defendant did not contend on appeal that

he was an indigent. Id. at 80, 150 S.E.2d at 10.
A7The court is saying that since the defendant was, by inference, not an
indigent, therefore he was not entitled to appointed counsel, therefore failure
to warn him of a right he did not have did not prejudice him in any respect.
Id. at 83.
" It is obvious that such an interrogation environment [an interrogation room in a police station] is created for no purpose other than
to subjugate the individual to the will of his examination. This atmosphere carries its own badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not
physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human dignity.
The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with
one of our Nation's most cherished principles-that the individual
may not be compelled to incriminate himself. Unless adequate pro-

tective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in

custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can
truly be the product of his free choice.

384 U.S. at 457-58.
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RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAIVER

dant in the exercise of a right, which by inference, the defendant in
Grey did not have. It is in this sense that failure to warn of an
indigent's right to appointed counsel, when the officers do not know
the financial status of a suspect, is not as effective as giving the
warning. Whether the defendant is prejudiced or not is unimportant as the clear holding of Miranda is that the fourfold warning
or an equally effective procedure is an absolute prerequisite to the
admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation."
In Grey, the court also held it was relevant to the federal constitutional standard that the confession was made voluntarily. It is
clear, however, that under Miranda, voluntariness is not at issue.r0
As to voluntariness under state evidentiary standards, the court
seems to be indicating that in addition to Miranda requirements,
state standards impose the requirement of voluntariness. This is
consistent with the principle that federal constitutional guarantees
establish only minimum protective standards, which the states are
free to enlarge, but not diminish.
SAMUEL HOLLINGSWORTH, JR.

Constitutional Law-Waiver of Right to Counsel
An accused may waive his right to counsel, guaranteed to him
by the sixth amendment.' The courts, however, have been charged
with a protective duty to assure that such waiver is "intelligent and
competent."' As an accused's right to counsel has now been extended to state criminal proceedings, 3 the problem of waiver may
well become very important.
"Id.
at 479.
"oSee note 3 supra.
1 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall .. .have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "If the defendant
appears in court without counsel, the court shall advise him of his right to
counsel and assign counsel to represent him at every stage of the proceeding
unless he elects to proceed without counsel or is able to obtain counsel."
FED. R. CRIm. P. 44. "[T]he Constitution does not force a lawyer upon a
defendant. He may waive his constitutional right to assistance of counsel
if he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open."
Adams v. United States ex. rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942).
2ohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938).
' See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), extending the right of counsel to any suspect
whose freedom has been curtailed "in any significant way." Id. at 444.

